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Abstract: The narrative of Somalia as ‘a nation without a state’ has been central 
to analyses seeking to explain state failure, the absence of Weberian political 
authority, civil war, and the resurgence of radical Islamisation and terrorist 
networks. While the popular depiction on the causes of state collapse has 
focused on either external or internal factors, this article shows that the socio-
political construction of post-independent Somalia has been more contested 
than frequently depicted, even before the foreign intervention. It argues that 
foreign intervention exacerbated the existing inability of the government to build 
standard state building institutions, and created further diffi culties in forging 
nation-building. By revisiting the immediate post-colonial period of Somalia 
under the Soviet Union’s infl uence (1969-1978), the aim of this article is not to 
suggest that we should neglect the internal factors for Somalia’s troubled past, 
but to highlight the destructive consequences of foreign interventions (as an 
external factor) on post-colonial state-building. It provides further incentives 
for internal factors to become more pervasive in challenging contemporary 
international attempts to restore political order in Somalia.
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Abstrak: Naratif Somalia sebagai ‘sebuah negara tanpa negari’ telah menjadi 
tumpuan analisis-analisis bagi menjelaskan kegagalan negeri tersebut, ketiadaan 
pihak berkuasa politik Weberian, perang saudara, kebangkitan Islamisasi 
radikal, dan rangkaian pengganas. Gambaran popular terhadap penyebab 
keruntuhan negeri tersebut telah memfokuskan terhadap faktor-faktor luaran 
mahupun dalaman. Oleh itu, artikel ini menunjukkan bahawa pembentukan 
socio-politik selepas kemerdekaan Somalia telah dibincangkan lebih daripada 
biasa, mahupun sebelum campur tangan asing. Ia membincangkan bahawa 
campur tangan asing telah memburukkan lagi keadaan ketidakupayaan 
kerajaan tersebut untuk membina institusi pembangunan negeri yang standard, 
seterusnya mencipta lagi kesukaran bagi memupuk pembangunan negara. 
Dengan mengkaji semula tempoh selepas penjajahan Somalia di bawah 
pengaruh Soviet Union (1969-1978), aritkel ini bukanlah bertujuan untuk 
mencadangkan supaya kita patut mengabaikan faktor-faktor dalaman semasa 
Somalia menghadapi masa lalu yang bermasalah, sebaliknya ia adalah bertujuan 
untuk menonjolkan kesan-kesan pemusnahan campur tangan asing (sebagai 
faktor luaran) terhadap pembangunan negara tersebut selepas penjajahan. Ia 
memberikan insentif terhadap faktor-faktor dalaman yang membuatkannya 
lebih ketara dalam menangani percubaan antarabangsa kontemporari untuk 
memulihkan semula keadaan politik di Somalia.
Kata kunci: Somalia, Kesatuan Soviet, faktor dalaman, Perang Dingin, 
pembangunan negara
Introduction
Many represent Somalia as ‘unable to escape its past’ and often depict 
it as a stateless society (Hoahane, 2013; Dehez&Gebreworld, 2010). 
Having achieved its independence in the 1960s, Somalia was marked 
by dictatorial rule. Luigi Pestalozzi (1974, p. 40) described the fi rst 
republic as ‘…one of the most corrupted and inept regimes that had 
grown up in Africa in the shadow of neo-colonialism’. By the mid-
1960s, Somalia had slipped into ‘an artifi cial democracy’ (Lewis, 
1993) or ‘commercialised anarchy’ (Lewis, 1982), which successively 
paved the way for the military regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre 
to seize power in the 1970s. During Barre’s military regime, Somalia 
was subjected to mounting interventions and external prescriptions by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union and their Cold War politics 
in Africa. Since the collapse of Barre’s regime in 1991, Somalia has 
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struggled to build political order due to the challenges of terrorism, 
piracy, and trans-border criminal activities as well as other non-
traditional security issues (Shaw, 2014; Aime, 2013).
The political history and state formation in Somalia have been 
studied extensively. The majority of such studies have adopted the 
‘Orthodox Failed State Narratives’ (Verhoeven, 2009, p. 406). The 
contemporary international commitment that underpins these narratives 
can be regarded as a source rather than a solution to the problem. The 
global state-building and peacebuilding projects are often pursued 
through heavy foreign involvement and its top-down impositions 
which may sometimes be contrary to local aspirations. With the recent 
publication of Christopher Clapham’s The Horn of Africa: State 
Formation and Decay (2017), it is more important to invigorate how 
Somalia’s troubled past hindered ongoing attempts of building political 
order, law, and security in the present situation of the country. While 
the literature attempts to mostly focus on recent Western intervention in 
different confl ict zones in Africa, it is important to illuminate Cold War 
intervention in Somalia. In short, the Cold War foreign prescriptions in 
Somalia (under Barre) destroyed the social contracts between the state 
and society. Menkhaus noted that it is crucial to acknowledge the fact that 
Somalia’s early independence period and the substantial implications 
of foreign intervention have rarely been assessed before things fell 
apart, or before the state failed in 1991. Such a view could shed light 
on previously underappreciated aspects of the nation, particularly the 
Soviet involvement in Somalia and the Cold War politics (Menkhaus, 
2014, p. 562).
This paper discusses how foreign intervention exacerbates the 
current inability of Somali society to forge state and nation building. It 
is argued that while the socio-political construction of post-independent 
Somalia has been more contested than depicted, foreign intervention 
during the Cold War accelerated the state’s collapse in 1991. By 
revisiting the immediate post-colonial period of Somalia under the 
Soviet Union’s infl uence (1969-1978), our aim is not to suggest that 
we should neglect the internal factors to state collapse in Somalia, but 
to highlight the destructive costs of foreign intrusions (as an external 
factor) on state-building. Such intervention has exacerbated internal 
problems to become more pervasive and obstructed attempts to restore 
political order in Somalia.
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This paper fi rst explores the framework in explaining the trajectory 
of state and nation-building in Somalia. After outlining the framework 
to discuss state- making, this paper will discuss Cold War Somalia 
under the short-lived infl uence of the Soviets in three specifi c areas: i) 
scientifi c socialism as a national ideology; ii) socialist economic policy; 
and iii) military and foreign policies of Siad Barre between 1969-1978. 
The paper concludes by probing the overall effects of the Cold War 
foreign intervention and its signifi cant impact on contemporary or post-
confl ict state building in Somalia.
State Making as ‘Rule Standardisation’ in Somalia
The consequences of foreign intervention on state and nation-
building in Somalia are conceptualised using Balthasar’s (2014) ‘rule 
standardisation’. Within the literature of the modern political history 
of Somalia, it is accepted that a point of reference to the origins of an 
acceptable governance structure developed in the 1960s when Somalia 
achieved its independence under the recognition of both Britain and 
Italy (see Pham, 2011). When then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke 
was assassinated on October 21, 1969, the public was concerned with 
the inability of the civilian regime, and initially supported the military in 
seizing control in Mogadishu (C. A. H. Jaras, personal communication, 
October 21, 2011). In consolidating his military rule (1969-1991), Barre 
immediately deposed the civilian government and sought external 
support from the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Mankhaus (2009), Elliot 
& Holzer (2009), Retino & Shaw (2017) and Clapham (2007) criticised 
the existing literature on state building in Somalia for its heavy focus on 
institutional aspects of state building and downplaying the exogenous 
roles of foreign actors in securing their interests and hindering state 
and nation-building in Somalia. In this respect, this paper borrows the 
analytical concept of ‘state making’ is best understood as a two-part 
process of rule standardisation’ proposed by Balthasar (2014) on state 
authority projections in the Horn of Africa. Drawing from the political 
ethnographic writings of Clapham (1996) and Anderson and Broch-
Due (2000) on history, politics and philosophy of East Africa, Balthasar 
(2014, p. 225) concluded two important spectrums in discussing the 
projection of state authority in Somalia.
First, state-making is similar to state-building in terms of institutional 
standardisation in which the rules of the game (written laws and political 
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regulations) produced by political factions dominate and regulate all 
types of political relations in the society (p. 225). Second, state-building 
intersects with nation-building. This standardises the national identity 
as a common idea of the state or rules of the public mind (p. 226).
Nonetheless, in the broad literature of fi xing failed states and foreign 
intervention, the international solution is often underpinned by the 
neoliberal or liberal peace’s logic of hybridity, pluralism, and diversity 
(see also Ginty, 2015). While it is true that political pluralism cements 
democracy in advanced nations, the initial state- making endeavours are 
not pluralistic, but a focus on the rules of state and nation-building as 
historically exhibited in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and John Locke’s 
Two Treaties of Government (Balthasar, 2014, p.227).
In short, translating this understanding into theoretical considerations 
of state making means that the competitive and diverse political 
factions need to pave the way for the state framework and centrally 
regulated authority that is less contested, and more united and credible 
in defending the nation-state from external and internal threats (see 
Young, (2004; Taylor, 2010).Consequently, state making is the overall 
process that begins with standardisation to forge common parameters 
for state unity and identity. Along these lines, Anderson (2006), North 
(1990), Levene (2000), Clapham (1996, 2017), Bayart (2009) and 
Chabal & Daloz (1999) argued that in the beginning, the state exists 
not to promote diversity, but to organise policies – either by force or 
voluntarily – to be uniform in a real sense. Yet, and as critiqued by Paris 
(2004), Sisk (2013), and Richmond (2011), the salient institutionalist 
focus of state-building prevalent in the literature of state-making in 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq glosses over another critical 
aspect of state making, namely foreign intervention.
If colonialism has delayed the modern transformation (Ayoob, 
1995) of Africa by preventing it from consolidating its central political 
authority after independence, then the neo-imperialism exemplifi ed 
through foreign intervention and proxy wars during the Cold War 
(Nkrumah, 1974) exacerbated past and present state-making activities 
in Somalia. While we recognise the continued inabilities of local 
political agencies in fi lling the vacuum of central political authority and 
national ideology in Somalia, it is pertinent to revisit the Soviet’s role in 
implementing contradictory policies. This shall serve as a reminder that 
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the ongoing confl icts in various parts of Somalia are still awash with the 
remnants of the Cold War.
The Military Rule in Somalia under Soviet Guidance (1969-1978)
For Moscow, Somalia was a tinderbox of tension, prized for its strategic 
location in securing the Soviet’s military base and access to oil and 
trade routes in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba, and the greater Indian 
Ocean (Schmidt, 2013). Beset by its internal inability to develop a 
central authority after the military seized power in 1969, to cope with 
the existing disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya, and the United States’ 
rejection of USD 9 million to upgrade its army, Siad Barre announced 
Somalia’s commitment to the tenets of scientifi c socialism (Griffi ths, 
2016). Accordingly, on its fi rst anniversary in October of 1970, Barre 
announced that scientifi c socialism would guide the country and 
changed its name to the Somali Democratic Republic (Ismail, 2010, 
p. 219). For Barre, to have a strong bond with the Soviets was crucial, 
as they provided him aid during the Cold War, which in actuality was 
due to the fact that the Soviets were interested in Somalia’s strategic 
location in Africa and the Middle East.
The Soviets were providing political advice and economic aid, as 
well as military training and weapons. On July 1974, the Soviet President 
Nikolai Podgorny paid an offi cial visit to Mogadishu, and Somalia 
signed several treaties with the Soviets including the Somali-Soviets’ 
Friendship Treaty on July 11, 1974. However, the Soviet’s infl uence in 
Somalia was short-lived with the outbreak of the Somali-Ethiopian War 
(1977-1978) in which both Somalia and Ethiopia effectively switched 
sides in the Cold War (Brayton, 1979, p. 260). The Horn of Africa 
witnessed the enduring persistence of both USSR and the US who were 
happy to exploit the local war (Schmidt, 2013, p. 24). Somalia came to a 
disagreement with the Soviets during the 1977-78 war, and the shifting 
proxies solidifi ed the new alliance of superpowers and their geostrategic 
interests in the Horn of Africa. This fallout with Moscow eventually 
backfi red upon the existing tensions in Somalia and affected Barre’s 
authority to suppress local opposition. 
Scientifi c Socialism as National Ideology
As noted earlier, on October 21, 1970, the military regime announced 
that scientifi c socialism is the only cure for underdevelopment and 
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tribalism (Pestalozzi, 1974, p. 54). Even 46 years after the beginning 
of military rule, it was debated as to whether the Soviets had a role 
in assisting the army to seize power, especially given the Mogadishu-
Moscow ties since 1963. Copper (2008, p. 17) stated, “Following the 
military coup of 1969, Soviet military assistance to Somalia increased 
substantially, and several hundred Soviet offi cers (military advisers) and 
technicians with more equipment were to follow” Recently declassifi ed 
documents from US intelligence confi rmed the Soviet’s intentions in 
securing a military base in the Horn of Africa (Clapham, 2017, p. 45; 
Schmidt, 2013, p. 234). While Barre’s initial request for US support was 
turned down by President Lyndon Johnson1, the Soviets were more than 
keen to transform Somalia into a socialist state. As a result, Somalia 
became a bona fi de member of the Eastern bloc, and Barre’s policies 
were praised by Moscow (Galaydh, 1990, p.13).
In January 1971, the Second Charter came out with its detailed 
dedication to scientifi c socialism. By this time, Siad Barre knew how 
best to appease Moscow in order to secure its support for his regime 
(see Davidson, 1975). In the early 1970s, no other African socialist 
leader seemed to enjoy a special friendship with the Soviets as much 
as Barre, especially with his offi cial visit to the Kremlin (Traub, 2010, 
p. 83). In return, the Soviets promised more weapons and fi nancial aid 
to Mogadishu, who had, for years, been Moscow’s closest African ally 
(Bridges, 2000, p. 6). As a result of these changes, Siad Barre’s picture 
was placed on par with pictures of Marx, Engels, and Lenin everywhere.
To ensure the successful implementation of his scientifi c socialism, 
Barre introduced the Domestic Seven-Point Policy as a domestic 
politics guideline – based on social justice, economic progress, illiteracy 
eradication and the development of a writing system for the Somali 
language, elimination of corruption and anarchy, and the abolishment 
of political parties. On November 11, 1970, during his public rally at 
the Cons Stadium, Barre declared tribalism as the enemy to nation-
building and barred the practice of diyah (blood money) and certain 
Islamic traditions which were perceived as an impediment to the path 
of progress and scientifi c society (Schmidt, 2013, p. 238). In addition, 
he issued numerous political decrees which favoured a progressive 
society. His regime also abolished all clan titles such as sultan and chief 
(local authority) and dismissed every holder of these titles (Ismail, 
2010, p. 235). State media, including newspapers, Radio Mogadishu 
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and Mogadishu’s National Theatre, were used to indoctrinate the public 
on scientifi c socialism (S. A. Mohamud, Personal Communication, 
December 12, 2012).
Given Barre’s obsession with Soviet guidance, not everyone in 
Somalia condoned the socialist path taken by his regime. Like other 
post-colonial African states, Somalia lacked political ideology in 
transforming the Somalians into citizens and the country into a modern 
state (Young, 2004; Taylor, 2010). This resulted in a disconnect between 
state and society and furthered ‘dialectical diffi culties’ for Siad Barre to 
reconcile national ideological confl icts between the external impositions 
of scientifi c socialism and customary ideas of Islam and clan affi liations 
(Hohne, 2006, p. 405). Hence, various militaristic legal decrees were 
enacted throughout the reign of Barre (Samatar, 1994, p. 38).  These 
laws provided extra-draconian legal and executive powers for his 
military regime to use violence in dealing with dissidents (Ismail, 2010, 
p. 220). 
At the same time, Somalia’s unholy alliance with the Soviets was 
followed with a mixed response from various segments of Somalia. 
Barre received immediate support from the military, middle-class 
professionals, intellectuals, and community leaders who came from 
similar clans as Barre. Dissident views came from various sheikhs 
(traditional religious leaders) who refused to accept Barre’s view on 
cushioning political Islam with scientifi c socialism (Rabasa, 2009, p. 
10). He tried to convince many sheikhs that scientifi c socialism was 
not against the tenets of Islam but disproved the reactionary elements 
of religion that dominate the sound reasoning of mankind and hence, 
hinder the progress of society. This is clear evidence that Islam was 
readily misused and ignored by both Barre and traditional sheikhs when 
debating the national identity of Somalia in the 70s (see also Loimeier, 
2013). In fact, by 1975, the state-owned media attempted to interpret 
Islam in favour of Barre’s socialism, which was in contrast to the 
sheikhs’ interpretation (Bradbury, 2008, p. 37).
Failure to appease the dissident sheikhs who later declared Barre 
an infi del led to their arrest and sentencing to death by fi ring squad in 
Mogadishu on January 23, 1975. Hundreds fl ed, massive numbers were 
imprisoned, and ten sheikhs were executed because of their opposition 
to Siad Barre’s regime. According to Rabasa (2009, p. 12), the dissident 
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sheikhs’ views were in line with the Qur’ān (5: 11). According to Sheikh 
Ali Mohamoud (Personal Communication, December 12, 2012), the 
execution of these sheikhs deeply affected society’s loyalty to the state 
and initiated grave nonconformity between the state and the society. 
The people did not trust Siad Barre’s political slogans and accused him 
of murdering innocent Muslims to appease his communist patrons. The 
situation was exacerbated by all political oppositions being harassed, 
prosecuted or murdered. 
In sum, the military elements in justifying scientifi c socialism 
were problematic and contested by various political factions (see also 
Schmidt, 2008; Schlee, 2013). Underlying the regime’s extensive reform 
was manipulative implementation and the extra-judicial and militaristic 
nature of the state to control the people and consolidate Barre’s rule 
(Issa-Salwe, 1996, p. 80). This created discord and resistance to 
contemporary attempts of state-building in Somalia.
The Socialist Economic Model
Somalia’s economic policy was moulded to achieve the objectives of the 
socialist government (Mohamud, 2006, p. 92). This was materialised by 
nationalising the properties of Italians and accusing them of representing 
capitalist institutions. Barre disrupted the Italians’ economic ties with 
the local elites. Given the bleak economic and governance records of 
the previous civilian government, it is fairly understandable why the 
public warmly received his nationalistic economic views, and nearly 
no one rejected Barre’s New Economic Policy (Desfosses, 1987). By 
removing the existing modern economic system introduced by the 
Italians, Barre’s central economic model was initially in line with many 
Somalis’ aspirations to eradicate poverty, economic injustice, and other 
socioeconomic disadvantages structured by the former colonial master’s 
greed and grievance (Clapham, 2017, p. 34). The regime’s fi nal goal was 
to interfere with the state’s fi nancial and banking systems, and in May 
1970, Somalia witnessed a dramatic change to its fi nancial system when 
Mogadishu nationalised four international banks, mostly from Italy and 
Egypt. With the forced acquisition of modern economic institutions, 
Barre marked the collapse of modern fi scal systems. Since then, it has 
been a painstaking effort to rebuild Somalia’s war-torn economy (Pham, 
2011, p. 149).
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To show his readiness to eradicate foreign control of the economy, 
Barre increased the Somali Central Bank’s power to regulate the state’s 
fi nancial jurisdictions, particularly the exchange rate. For foreign 
currencies, including the US dollar, the Central Bank set its rates 
such that black-market exchanges were seen as serious crimes, with 
possible punishments of 15 to 20 years imprisonment (Lewis, 2002). In 
Mogadishu’s view, the state had the right to control its assets (Lewis, 
1993; 2002; 1982). 
Because of these simplistic economic views, Barre issued decrees 
overnight, and Mogadishu adopted price controls and various central 
planning instruments to fi x prices for livestock to reduce the price of food. 
To control the everyday economic transaction of his people, his regime 
increased rental rates, the fl ow of money, and foreign exchange. Siad 
Barre’s patronage rules eventually extended to microeconomics when 
he established a state-owned Agricultural Development Corporation 
to control the local agricultural sector, resulting in high prices and 
the destruction of the rice cultivation industry (Samatar, 1994, p. 97). 
Within a few years Siad Barre’s economic policy was failing and relying 
on the rhetorical crusades against the exploitation of local bourgeoisie, 
despite the fact that a real bourgeoisie never existed in Somalia (see also 
Markakis & Waller, 1986). 
The sudden nationalisation imposed upon the Italian business 
interests in Somalia as the ‘imagined enemy’ affected foreign trade 
as the state took over the import of cereals, fuel, medicine, fi lms, and 
later, the export of bananas, hides and skins (Lewis, 2002, p. 86). The 
areas most affected were the agricultural and livestock sectors in which 
the net profi t for production became less than the original investment, 
leaving no incentive for farmers to continue farming. Society perceived 
the state’s pricing policy as oppression. From village to village, trade 
became a crime, and security checkpoints were set up across the country 
to stop inter-village trading. This policy was not only against society’s 
well-being as envisioned by Barre, but unintendedly created the culture 
of aid dependency with the Soviets (Woodward, 2002).
Barre’s hasty economic policy negated his people’s aspiration to 
progress. According to Bridges (2000, p. 99), part of the problem stemmed 
from “Barre’s poor understanding of economics but exacerbated by his 
obsessions with socialism”. His Soviet advisers encouraged scientifi c 
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socialism, which in its early years enjoyed the support of many educated 
Somalis. It was evident that the Soviets intentionally concealed Barre’s 
impractical economic policies from public knowledge given Moscow’s 
main concern was to rival the US in the Horn of Africa (Bayart, 2009; 
Chabal &Daloz, 1999; Traub, 2010). In reality, Barre’s central economic 
model caused more perplexities since it was not easy for ordinary 
Somalis to apply Marxist theory in local economic practices. In fact, 
neither true capitalism nor socialism had ever been part of the Somalian 
state and society (Markakis & Waller, 1986; Woodward, 2002). 
This paper notes that given the destruction of documented evidence 
during the civil war in the 1990s, it is nearly impossible to acquire 
reliable econometric data on Somalia under Siad Barre’s administration. 
According to Pestalozzi (1974, p. 36), in the 1970s Somalia was one 
of the most backward of all African nations with a declining GDP per 
capita. It was among the poorest in the world. In terms of economic 
output, there was only a marginal difference between Somalia under 
the socialist regime and the previous civilian regime (Mohamud, 2006, 
p. 93). Scientifi c socialism appears to be nothing more than a slogan 
reminiscent of Soviet presence as it did little to help Somalia escape 
poverty (Ottaway, p. 1982, p. 72).
Somalia’s Militaristic Worldview and Foreign Policy
Barre adopted a militaristic view in formulating Somalia’s foreign policy 
as an extension of its domestic policy (Woodward, 2002). Upon seizing 
power in Mogadishu, Siad Barre responded to the US’s reluctance to 
provide USD 9 million to modernise Somalia’s military capability by 
turning to the Soviets (Lewish, 2002). He dishonoured the agreements 
made by the previous Somali civilian government with Italy, West 
Germany, and the US whereby they had agreed to offer a paltry USD10 
million, provided Somalia agreed to end its diplomatic ties with the 
Soviets (Schmidt, 2013). Barre then accepted the Soviet’s initial offer 
of USD 32 million which later increased to USD 55 million, including 
a complete package of training 10,000 Somali soldiers. Somalia’s 
acceptance brought an end to the monopoly of the Western block in 
arms sales and initiated the fl ow of arsenal from the Soviets (Desfosses, 
1987). By the 1970s, Barre expelled a number of American diplomats, 
military attaches, and Peace Corps workers and the US retaliated by 
concluding its economic and partial military ties with Somalia.
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In response, the Soviet Union intensifi ed its economic and military 
support for Somalia’s foreign policy with an augmented number of 1000 
Soviet advisers in Mogadishu (Griffi ths, 2016). In short, the Soviets 
were Somalia’s only source of military equipment including tanks, 
fi ghter planes, and bombers in the 70s. Between 1971 and 1974, around 
1400 Soviet personnel actively advised Barre’s regime on political 
ideology, economic planning and foreign policy orientations. (Schmidt, 
2013, p. 78). In fact, Somalia was among the fi rst sub-Saharan African 
countries that signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow, procuring a 
total of USD 30 million worth of weapons and military equipment. By 
1976, with 22,000 infantry and soldiers, Somalia was the fourth most 
heavily armed nation on the African continent (Brayton, 1979). Given 
such peculiarities of Cold War Africa, it is not hard to imagine the 
antagonistic nature of Barre’s foreign policy when he came to power. 
He outlined his foreign policy’s orientation with six articles.2 These 
six articles were aligned with the Soviets’ worldview during the Cold 
War. Articles one and two supported Soviet propaganda (Colombant, 
2011) while article three advanced the idea of Greater Somalia. In other 
words, in building Somalia, the military regime was using ‘struggle’ 
to fi ght against other African states to realise the notion of Greater 
Somalia.
Ironically, articles four and fi ve contradicted articles one and two, 
as they categorically recognised the principality of peaceful coexistence 
among nations and called for a policy of positive neutrality. The problem 
lay in the fact that if Somalia supported the liberation movements in 
neighbouring Eastern African countries, then it could not be expected 
to maintain neutrality in its foreign policy (see also Lewis, 2002). Barre 
appeared willing to support separatist movement such as the Somali 
Western Liberation Front’s (SWLF) struggle against Ethiopia, which 
violated articles four, fi ve, & six of his foreign policy orientations. In this 
respect, there is reason to question how mutual respect for sovereignty 
principles could be attained by Somalia when Barre’s regime did not 
hesitate to support the WSLF against the Ethiopian armed forces. 
Additionally, Barre had promised to respect all international legal 
commitments undertaken by the previous Somalia Republic, including 
adherence to the UN Charter, which obligates all nations to refrain from 
hostile policies and military intervention in other countries (including 
Somalia’s traditional enemies, Ethiopia and Kenya).
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Hence, it could be argued that while Barre’s worldview is a paradox 
to Somalia as a Third World country. It was the existing structural 
dependency of Mogadishu upon Moscow in the 1970s that exposed 
the vulnerability of its domestic affairs. Even if Barre expressed his 
recognition of all international commitments (undertaken by the 
previous Somali Republic), his militaristic views of securing Greater 
Somalia was in violation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) 
commitments to retain colonial boundaries. Since he needed public 
support, he re-energised the Greater Somalia project as one of his 
foreign policy goals, while still harbouring the hypocrisy of respect for 
sovereignty (which he never practised) (Woodward, 2002). The army’s 
nationalist doctrine, the regime’s militaristic view, and the Soviets’ 
weaponry together created many complications that Somalia found it 
challenging even to defend its existing territorial integrity.
Given such delicate intricacy and selectivity, it is not diffi cult to 
recognise the immediate Soviet infl uence on Barre’s foreign policy. In 
terms of international relations, he classifi ed the world into two rival 
blocs. This worldview refl ected the existing tensions between the USSR 
and the US (Clapham, 2017, p. 56). Additionally, in constructing the 
idea of the state and nation, Barre was as equally opportunistic as his 
predecessor in redefi ning Somalia’s threats. Accordingly, colonialism 
and neo-colonialism were seen as the greatest threat to the well-
being of Somalis (Samatar, 1994, p.116). In line with Siad Barre’s 
vision of Greater Somalia, the Somali national army was training and 
providing light weapons to various separatist Somali movements from 
the eastern region of Ethiopia – defying the impossibility by killing 
two birds (intersecting irredentism and separatism) with one stone 
(Samatar, 1987, p. 675). Somalia’s foreign policy under the Soviets 
was marked by profound contradictions and a vivid attempt to maintain 
the autonomy of a weak political order while deliberately gambling the 
future of the country (Ottaway, 1982, p.71). Despite numerous attempts 
and diffi culties faced by Barre in building a Greater Somalia, foreign 
intervention under the short-lived presence of the Soviets accelerated 
the process of Somalia eventually becoming a failed state.
Conclusion: Still Searching to become a State
This paper demonstrated the Soviet Union’s contribution to Somalia’s 
state-making attempts whereby Moscow’s ill-advice on the national, 
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economic, and foreign policies exacerbated the existing diffi culties of 
Somali’s political agency to develop standardised rules of political order 
to unify the nation. What was previously regarded as purely internal 
factors (extremism and tribalism) are consequences or indications 
of the poor governance of Barre’s military regime. To sustain his 
state and nation-building under the auspices of Moscow, including 
fi nding support for his scientifi c socialism, central economic policy 
and militaristic foreign policy, Barre opted for repressive, draconian 
measures. These disintegrated Somali society and led to the collapse 
of vital state institutions. It supported the emergence of extremism and 
tribalism which are often cited as impediments to contemporary confl ict 
resolution in rebuilding Somalia since the end of the Cold War.
Given the salient character of the Soviet guidance during Barre’s 
reign, we fi nd that although Somalia is often presumed as unwilling or 
unable to be governed, many of the predicaments that plague the Horn 
of Africa today are not solely the product of Somalia’s political agency 
but are also interrelated with the outcome of foreign interventions in 
African affairs (see also Schmidt, 2013).This established the idea of 
foreign intervention as intrusions by political powers external to Africa. 
As such, interventions were structured in the form of unsymmetrical 
power relations between African states and the superpowers. Apart from 
aggression and war, foreign intervention during the Cold War manifested 
in the form of policy engagement, political involvement and ideological 
commitment, including the use of the carrot and stick approach by 
foreign actors to meddle in Somalia’s domestic affairs. More often, 
intervention has adverse consequences (Clapham, 2017). Given the 
destructiveness of Soviet collaborations with Barre’s regime, it is not 
hard to imagine the persistence of post-colonialism and the image of 
the white man’s burden in contextualising post-Cold War Somalia when 
perceiving the idea of foreign advice or prescriptions in post-confl ict 
reconstruction or rebuilding stateless Somalia (Bakonyi, 2013).
In struggling to secure superpower support to realise his ambitions 
in building a future for Greater Somalia, Barre unintendedly created 
a radical socialist state system which altered the existing customary 
values and traditional social relations that pitched the zero-sum game 
of modernity versus traditions, and secularism versus Islamism (see 
Barnes & Hassan, 2007). In return, the Soviets secured Somalia (short-
lived though) as their proxy against the existing Western sphere of 
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infl uence in Africa and provided the security assurances requested by 
Siad Barre. As a result, a long-lasting distrust among political clans in 
Somalia towards the idea of central state authority was triggered off 
(Lindley, 2013). Those painstaking years and the grave mistakes of Said 
Barre that dishonoured his people have allowed the already fragmented 
Somali political community to easily retreat to radical interpretations 
of Islam to cater for the harsh political reality of living in a stateless 
Somalia.
Endnotes
1. Having achieved its independence in the 1960s, Somalia, under the civilian 
government, had requested military aid from President Kennedy (1961-1963). 
When Siad Barre came to power in 1969, he initially requested similar aid from 
the US, but President Johnson (1963-1969) refused, and eventually this pushed 
Barre to seek similar aid from the Soviet.
2. Somalia Today. (1970), printed by the State Printing Agency, p. 46.
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